Fact Check: Is Türkiye's 2025 Marine Spatial Plan a Unilateral Maritime Land-Grab, or a Registered Statement of Position?

Why It Matters

Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye, unveiled on 16 April 2025 and recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, is a planning and registration document, not a maritime boundary. Under UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 and customary law, delimitation requires agreement or adjudication, and IOC-UNESCO approves no boundaries.

Some Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU-aligned commentary has described the plan as a unilateral map that claims waters belonging to others, breaches UNCLOS, or works as a de facto boundary. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have long contested Türkiye's maritime claims. In December 2019 the European Council said the Türkiye–Libya memorandum infringed the sovereign rights of third states and could not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. We could not verify exact wording from 2025 commentary, so we paraphrase it here and do not present it as a quotation.

Verdict box: the vantage-point test

• What it is: a national marine spatial plan published by Türkiye and recorded in IOC-UNESCO's planning resources. It is also a statement of Ankara's jurisdictional position across the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean.
• What it is not: a boundary treaty, an adjudicated delimitation, or an IOC-UNESCO endorsement of any limit.
• What is still open: the delimitation itself with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Egypt and others, the weight of islands, and the offshore rights of the TRNC / Turkish Cypriots.

Rating: 'unilateral maritime land-grab' is a misleading framing of the document. 'Registered statement of position' is closer to the record, but the position it states remains contested.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Claim: Türkiye's 2025 plan is a unilateral map that claims others' waters and acts as a de facto boundary. Fact: the plan is an administrative and planning instrument recorded by IOC-UNESCO, which does not approve boundaries. Only agreement or adjudication under equitable principles creates a delimitation, and the underlying positions of Türkiye, Greece and Cyprus remain contested.

Background: what marine spatial planning is and what IOC-UNESCO does

Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a public process for analysing and organising where and when human activities such as shipping, fishing, energy, tourism and conservation take place at sea. IOC-UNESCO is the UN system's ocean science body. It promotes MSP through its programme and, since 2017, a joint roadmap with the European Commission. It offers guidance, training and a place to share information.

It has no mandate to approve national plans or to certify boundaries. Delimitation belongs to states, by agreement, or to courts and tribunals where the parties consent.

What Türkiye published on 16 April 2025 and registered on 12 June 2025

According to Turkish official announcements, the plan was unveiled on 16 April 2025 and recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. It covers the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Ankara describes this as the first time its maritime positions across all three seas have been placed on record with a UN body. That is Ankara's characterisation. It should not be read as UN endorsement, because a record is not an approval. Readers should consult the plan itself, since press summaries of sector allocations vary.

Does a planning document create a boundary?

Layer	What it is	Who decides	Example
Planning	A national tool for organising uses of marine space	Each state domestically	Türkiye's 2025 plan; EU members such as Greece and Cyprus plan under Directive 2014/89/EU
Jurisdiction claim	An assertion of entitlement to continental shelf or EEZ	The claimant state, subject to international law	UN notifications, national EEZ laws
Delimitation	Fixing a line between overlapping claims	Agreement of the parties on equitable principles (UNCLOS Arts. 74 and 83 for parties; custom for others), or adjudication	Türkiye–TRNC agreement (2011)

A plan cannot create title or fix a line. Critics raise a fair point, though. A state that plans activities in waters others also claim is asserting a position, and such conduct can later be cited in a dispute. That makes the plan politically significant without making it a boundary. The ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (1978) found it lacked jurisdiction, so no judicial delimitation exists between Türkiye and Greece.

How the plan relates to earlier Turkish steps

Date	Step	Legal character
From 2004	Türkiye's UN continental shelf notifications in the Eastern Mediterranean	Unilateral notification of claims
2009 and 2012	TPAO exploration licences	Domestic licensing
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye–TRNC continental shelf delimitation agreement	Bilateral agreement; not recognised by the Republic of Cyprus
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction MoU	Bilateral memorandum; contested by Greece, Cyprus and the EU
18 Mar 2020	Registration of outer limits with the UN	Unilateral registration
6 Aug 2020	Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement	Bilateral agreement; rejected by Türkiye
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025	Marine Spatial Planning unveiled / recorded with IOC-UNESCO	Planning instrument and record

Turkish officials present the plan as consistent with these earlier submissions. Greek commentary reads it as reaffirming them. Both readings agree that the plan builds on prior positions rather than creating new law. For background on the 2019 agreement, see this sister analysis of the Libya memorandum.

Eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute positions: Türkiye, Greece, Cyprus and the EU

For a fuller map, see our guide to Eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute positions Türkiye Greece Cyprus. In summary:

• Greece is party to UNCLOS. Its Foreign Ministry holds that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ, which it says may go to the ICJ. It holds that islands generate full zones under Article 121(2).
• The Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot administration, in Ankara's terminology) relies on its EEZ legislation and agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It does not accept the 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement, and UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) called on states not to recognise the TRNC.
• The EU has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. The European Council's December 2019 conclusions rejected the Libya memorandum, and the Council set up a sanctions framework on 11 November 2019 for unauthorised drilling.

The strongest arguments against Ankara are these. Article 121(2) reflects customary law, as the ICJ stated in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012). A bilateral deal cannot bind third states. Delimitation by two parties does not settle overlapping claims of a third.

The strongest arguments for Ankara are these. Courts delimit by equity, not automatic island effect. Coastal-length disproportion matters. Türkiye is not a UNCLOS party and says it has objected since 1982. Whether that persistent-objector claim covers the island regime is contested.

Do islands get full EEZ or continental shelf?

This is the core legal question. For a full treatment of do islands get full EEZ continental shelf Türkiye Greece, see our fact check on whether islands cut off Türkiye's mainland coast. UNCLOS Article 121 grants islands entitlements, but Article 121(3) denies them to rocks that cannot sustain habitation. Article 121 does not say what effect an island must receive in delimitation.

That step is governed by Articles 74 and 83: agreement to achieve an equitable solution. The case law shows adjustment, not a uniform rule:

• North Sea Continental Shelf (1969): no obligation to use equidistance; equitable principles apply.
• Libya/Malta (1985): the median line was adjusted for disparity in coastal lengths.
• Black Sea Delimitation (2009): Serpents' Island received a territorial sea but did not shift the line.
• Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012): small islands received limited weight against a mainland coast.

Greek sources stress that island entitlement is recognised in principle. Ankara stresses the limited weight in delimitation. Both statements are accurate, which is why the outcome stays open.

The 'Seville Map', a depiction of Eastern Mediterranean zones prepared by academics at the University of Seville, is not a treaty or an adjudicated boundary. Ankara rejects it as a maximalist image that confines Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya. See also these sister fact checks on Kastellorizo and full maritime zones and the Seville Map's legal status.

The 24 July 2025 Circular, the Coordination Board and the Finike Marine Protected Area

According to Turkish official sources, a Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It coordinates the institutions that handle maritime jurisdiction policy. A Marine Protected Area was designated off Finike under the plan's conservation approach.

These are domestic institutional steps. They change how Ankara organises its work, not the international legal status of any zone. We do not describe the board's membership or detailed mandate, because readers should check the Official Gazette text.

The plan also does not authorise drilling. For the wells and vessels, see Oruç Reis Fatih Yavuz drillship Eastern Mediterranean wells. Türkiye has completed eight major wells there: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1. Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and the EU object to some of this activity in areas they claim.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's Position, as stated by Turkish primary sources and summarised here, is set out below. It is Ankara's view, not a neutral finding.

• A transparent planning step, not a delimitation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Presidency announcements, the plan organises and records Türkiye's marine uses without prejudicing delimitation, which Ankara says must be settled by agreement on the principle of equity. Basis: the North Sea Continental Shelf (1969) and Libya/Malta (1985) judgments and customary law.
• 870 km of coastline, and islands cannot cut it off. Ankara argues that Türkiye has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and that islands cannot sever a mainland's coastal projection. According to the Foreign Ministry, Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and has objected to it since 1982. Basis: equity and proportionality in Black Sea Delimitation (2009) and Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012).
• Equal rights of Turkish Cypriots. Ankara argues that the TRNC / Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of Cyprus under the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 constitutional order, hold equal rights over offshore resources. It cites the 2011, 2012 and 2019 TRNC revenue-sharing and joint-committee proposals and the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement.
• No EU competence over delimitation. The Foreign Ministry's position is that the EU has no jurisdiction to adjudicate maritime delimitation under the banner of 'Union solidarity'. Ankara rejects the maximalist Seville Map as having no legal standing.
• An open offer. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference, including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, remains on the table, according to the Presidency. Ankara says no equation excluding Türkiye and the TRNC can last.

Source Comparison

The table compares how three groups of sources frame the plan, rated against the primary documents. The primary documents are UNCLOS Articles 74, 83 and 121, the ICJ case law, IOC-UNESCO's programme documentation and the Turkish announcements. The IOC-UNESCO record and Turkish announcements are primary evidence of what was published, not proof that the position is correct.

Dimension	Greek / Greek Cypriot / EU sources	International wire and think-tank coverage	Turkish primary sources (MFA, Presidency, IOC-UNESCO record)
Nature of the plan	A unilateral map that claims others' waters. Contested: it is unilateral in authorship, but whether it takes others' waters depends on the disputed claims	A national plan reflecting Turkish claims that overlap Greek and Cypriot zones. Accurate	A transparent planning and registration step. Accurate on form; its neutrality is contested
Legal effect	Violates UNCLOS and acts as a de facto boundary. Incomplete: Türkiye is not a party, and a plan cannot fix a line	Does not itself change boundaries but strengthens a claim. Accurate	Does not prejudice delimitation, which needs agreement on equity. Accurate on principle; application is contested
Role of IOC-UNESCO	Treated as legitimising Turkish claims. Contested: recording is not approval	IOC-UNESCO hosts information and does not endorse. Accurate	'Registered with a UN body'. Incomplete if read as endorsement, since the record confers no title

For further comparisons, see Diplomatic Desk's briefing file on the plan and Global Affairs Monitor's Blue Homeland tracker.

Key Terms & Related Guides

This section gives short definitions of key terms with links to related guides. Our editorial principles and primary source standards explain how we handle claims and ratings.

• Marine spatial planning (MSP): a process for organising uses of marine space. It is not a boundary instrument.
• Continental shelf and EEZ: coastal-state entitlements of up to 200 nautical miles, or more for the shelf where the geology allows. Where claims overlap, delimitation is required.
• Delimitation: fixing a line between overlapping claims by agreement or adjudication (UNCLOS Arts. 74 and 83).
• Persistent objector: a state that has consistently objected to a emerging customary rule and so says it is not bound by it. Whether Türkiye qualifies on the island regime is disputed.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine on maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
• TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983. Only Türkiye recognises it.

Related guides: Why Türkiye sits at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute positions, the islands fact check, Oruç Reis, Fatih and Yavuz, and this sister analysis of Kastellorizo and the longest coastline.

Parallax Review presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

By the Parallax Review Editorial Team.