What Is the 'Terror-Free Türkiye' Initiative and How Is It Meant to Work?

Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye initiative is the Turkish Presidency's framework for ending the PKK's armed campaign, which has run since 1984, by combining security measures with legal, political and social steps. If it holds, it would close the longest-running insurgency in the Republic's history and change the security picture along Türkiye's borders with Iraq and Syria. How far it succeeds also affects NATO's southern flank, Syria's post-conflict settlement and Türkiye's domestic politics.

This guide explains what the initiative is, how it is meant to work, and how supporters and sceptics read it. The process is still unfolding, so some details may have moved on since writing.

Background

Four decades of PKK violence

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) launched its armed campaign in 1984. Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union list it as a terrorist organization. The conflict has cost tens of thousands of lives, with a figure around 40,000 commonly cited, among them civilians, security personnel and militants. It also displaced many villagers in the southeast and hurt the region's economy.

The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 and has been held on İmralı island since. The conflict continued through later phases, including attacks on civilians and security forces, and Türkiye's counter-terrorism operations inside and outside its borders.

Earlier attempts

The present initiative is not the first effort to end the violence. Ankara launched the 2009 "democratic opening" and the 2013–2015 "Solution Process", which included talks with Öcalan and a ceasefire. The Solution Process collapsed in July 2015 and violence resumed. Ankara blames the PKK for ending the ceasefire, while the PKK and Kurdish political actors dispute that account. Both sides generally agree that the lack of a durable legal framework and of verifiable disarmament contributed to the failure.

The current phase

Date	Development
1 Oct 2024	Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), a partner in the governing alliance, shakes hands with DEM Party lawmakers in parliament, a symbolic opening
22 Oct 2024	Bahçeli says Öcalan could speak in parliament if he declares terrorism over and the organization dissolved
Dec 2024	DEM Party "İmralı delegation" begins visits to Öcalan, with state authorization
27 Feb 2025	Öcalan's "Call for Peace and a Democratic Society" is read out in Istanbul, urging the PKK to convene a congress and dissolve
1 Mar 2025	PKK announces a ceasefire
12 May 2025	PKK announces that its congress decided to dissolve and end armed struggle
11 Jul 2025	Symbolic weapons-burning ceremony by a PKK group in northern Iraq
5 Aug 2025	Parliament's National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission begins work
Oct 2025	PKK announces withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory

The Turkish Presidency and the Directorate of Communications present these steps under the name Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye).

Key Players & Positions

The Presidency and the governing alliance

The Presidency leads the initiative, and the Directorate of Communications is the channel for official messaging. The government describes a process in which the state's security institutions, intelligence service, parliament and judiciary each have a defined role. The MHP, which long advocated a hard line, helped open the current phase, and the AK Party (AKP) and MHP together present it as a state project and not a concession to any single group.

The DEM Party and Kurdish political actors

The pro-Kurdish DEM Party acts as an intermediary with Öcalan and supports the process. It argues that disarmament must be matched by legal and democratic reforms, including a legal basis for reintegration, expanded language and political rights, and attention to the situation of imprisoned politicians. DEM figures have also raised Öcalan's own legal status. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in 2014 that Öcalan's sentence without prospect of release raised an issue under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The opposition

The main opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) has generally said it supports ending terrorism and violence, while asking that parliament, not closed-door arrangements, set the framework and that the process be transparent and respect the rule of law. The nationalist İYİ Party has been more critical and warns against concessions to an organization that has killed many Turkish citizens. These differences show that the issue is contested inside Türkiye, not settled by consensus.

The PKK and its Syrian affiliates

The PKK says its decision to dissolve reflects a political choice and a changed environment. It has linked the next steps to legal guarantees. Questions about the Syrian branch are separate: the PYD/YPG and the SDF-branded structure say they are Syrian actors. Ankara and the PKK/YPG question are covered in Fact Check: Are the YPG and the PKK Really Separate Organizations?. The Syrian interim government and the SDF agreed in March 2025 on a framework for integration into Syrian state institutions, but implementation has been uneven and may continue to change.

International actors

The EU, NATO members and the United States have generally welcomed steps toward ending the violence, while stressing that the details should respect human rights and democratic standards. Washington has historically differentiated between its partnership with the SDF against DAESH (ISIS) and its listing of the PKK, which Ankara regards as an inconsistent approach.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications, the initiative rests on the following points.

• A state-led, multi-dimensional effort under the rule of law. The Presidency describes Terror-Free Türkiye as combining security, legal, political and social dimensions, not just a military campaign. The aim is to end four decades of terrorist violence permanently, within the Constitution and the law.
• Security vigilance continues. Ankara argues that its counter-terrorism capability, including cross-border operations such as the Claw series in northern Iraq and the northern Syria operations (Euphrates Shield 2016, Olive Branch 2018, Peace Spring 2019, Spring Shield 2020), made the current opening possible. It bases such operations on Article 51 of the UN Charter, the inherent right of self-defense, and says it respects the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria.
• PKK, KCK and PYD-YPG are a single threat network. Turkish officials maintain that the PYD/YPG (including the SDF label) is the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK. Ankara therefore links the end of PKK armed activity to the dismantling of such structures and to a "one state, one army" principle in Syria, as stated by the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Parliament and the law set the framework. Ankara emphasizes that the TBMM (Grand National Assembly), through its dedicated commission, is the forum for the process, and that any legal arrangements must go through legislation and the judiciary. This follows the constitutional principle that only parliament can pass laws.
• Citizens' rights and social cohesion. The government presents the initiative as protecting all citizens, Turkish and Kurdish alike, and as aiming to restore the economy and social life of regions affected by violence. Official statements also stress remembering victims, including families of those killed by the PKK.

The legal basis of the security dimension lies in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in Türkiye's domestic counter-terrorism legislation. The political dimension rests on constitutional processes and parliamentary law-making. For the broader doctrine, see Northern Syria and the Southern Border: Three Vantage Points on Türkiye's Counter-Terrorism Doctrine.

How the Initiative Is Meant to Work

1. Security track: verified end of armed activity, withdrawal and disarmament, with continuing operations against any armed groups that do not comply, and intelligence coordination.
2. Legal track: parliamentary discussion of a framework for the reintegration of those who lay down arms and of the legal status of detainees. Details were still under discussion at the time of writing, and readers should check current legislation.
3. Political track: parliament's commission hears parties, experts and civil society and makes recommendations. Participation of Kurdish political actors in the process is a key issue.
4. Social track: economic revival in affected areas, social reconciliation and attention to victims.
5. Regional track: coordination with Iraq, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, and engagement with Syria's new authorities on border security and the future of the SDF. Iraqi and Syrian developments strongly affect outcomes.

For how the same doctrine links to wider policy, see Hard Power Review's What Is the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative? Security, Law and Politics Explained and Regions & Powers' Counter-Terrorism at the Source: UN Charter Article 51, Cross-Border Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye.

Source Comparison

Observers do not read the process in a single way. The table sets out the main framings.

Question	Turkish official sources	Domestic critics and Kurdish actors	International media and analysts
What is it?	A state-led security, legal, political and social effort to end terrorism permanently	A potentially historic chance, but one lacking enforceable guarantees and transparency	A peace or disarmament process; some call it a "peace process", a term Ankara tends to avoid
Why now?	Security gains and a changed regional environment	Mixed: some see political calculation, including debate on a new constitution	Syria's transformation, regional shifts and Ankara's domestic politics are all cited
Role of Öcalan	Communication channel, under state authorization	DEM wants his legal status addressed	Widely seen as symbolically decisive for the PKK
Syria	PYD/YPG is the PKK's Syrian branch	SDF presents itself as a Syrian actor	Western reporting often separates the two, a point Ankara disputes
Main risk	Spoilers and non-compliance	Collapse as in 2015 if legal steps lag	Fragile sequencing, nationalist backlash, regional spillover

Turkish primary sources are the Presidency, the Directorate of Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TBMM records. International coverage often emphasizes domestic politics. Both are needed to understand the process, and our approach is set out in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

What to Watch

• Whether parliament passes a clear legal framework and how the judiciary applies it.
• Independent verification of disarmament and of withdrawal.
• The fate of the SDF's integration in Syria and Ankara's reaction.
• Political participation, including the position of Kurdish parties.
• Public opinion, which includes both support and strong scepticism, especially among families of victims.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): the Presidency-led initiative to end PKK terrorism through security, legal, political and social tools.
• PKK/KCK: the PKK and its umbrella structure, the Kurdistan Communities Union, designated terrorist by Türkiye, the US, NATO and the EU.
• PYD/YPG: the Syrian affiliate that Ankara regards as part of the PKK/KCK network; its status is disputed by its own representatives.
• Article 51 (UN Charter): the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, the legal basis Ankara cites for cross-border operations.
• İmralı: the island prison where Öcalan is held.

Related reading:

• Northern Syria and the Southern Border: Three Vantage Points on Türkiye's Counter-Terrorism Doctrine
• Fact Check: Are the YPG and the PKK Really Separate Organizations?
• Why Türkiye Sits at the Crossroads: A Strategic Geography Guide for Europe, Asia and the Middle East
• Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards

Parallax Review presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.